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Abstract Farmers are the key agents who manage land
and water. Agriculture Green Development (AGD)
requires a transformation in farming from high resource
consumption and environmental cost to sustainable
intensiﬁcation with high productivity, high resource use
efﬁciency and low environmental risk. This paper analyzes
the public policy challenge of AGD and makes the case for
a location-sensitive policy mix made up of regulation,
advice provision, voluntarism and targeted incentives. The
public agricultural extension service in China is a key
resource, but one that requires reorientation and reform
with the aim of better balancing high farm productivity
with environmental protection.
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1 Introduction: farmers as agents for
Agriculture Green Development (AGD)
Responding to degradation of the natural environment, and
in accord with the relevant UN Sustainable Development
Goals, policy makers and researchers in China increasingly
emphasize transformation of Chinese agriculture from high
resource consumption and environmental cost to sustain-
able intensiﬁcation with high productivity, high resource
use efﬁciency and low environmental risk[1]. This
transformation has been termed AGD in China. This
paper reviews policy options to achieve this in China.
Although the focus is on the actions of farmers, it should be
recognized that food and water consumers, and other actors
in farm input and output supply chains, also have
important inﬂuences and roles.
The nature and scale of the transformation needed can be
illustrated by the following. Recent estimates of the total
economic cost of environmental damage in the sector
range from 7% to 10% of national agricultural gross
domestic product[2]. Expansion of agricultural land has
resulted in signiﬁcant loss of wetlands and forests and their
ecological services, while over-exploitation of ground
water for intensiﬁed production is unsustainable in large
areas, especially in northern China[3]. Agriculture is a
major source of nutrient pollution of water, accounting for
approximately one third of the nitrogen released into
surface and ground waters; over 40% of rivers are severely
polluted and 80% of lakes suffer from eutrophication[3].
Approximately 20% of agricultural land, 10% of forest
land and 10% of grassland have been contaminated by
inorganic and organic pollutants[3].
Food and ﬁber production use more water and land than
other human activities, and thus how farmers manage
natural resources is of leading importance for the
conservation of ecosystems and the sustainability of
ecosystem services. Sustainable intensiﬁcation of farming
requires improvements in the quality and resilience of
ecosystems and of the services they provide to people,
including farm production. Farming practice particularly
impacts the sustainability of soil fertility, and water
quantity and quality for human and ecosystems use. For
water, land use and farming practice moderate: inﬁltration
of rainfall and soil moisture retention; demand for, and
storage of, water for irrigation; water consumed by crops
and livestock; and the quantity and pollution of surface and
subsurface drainage ﬂows[4].
How a farmer can best achieve high productivity, high
resource use efﬁciency and low environmental risk, and
manage inevitable trade-offs between these, depends on
local conditions and available technologies. Technologies
and farming practices well adapted to biophysical, farming
system and socioeconomic conditions are needed. These
can be termed ‘best management practices’ (BMPs). The
aim for public policy is to achieve the form and level of
adoption of BMPs by farmers that will achieve society’s
goals. Such goals in China include achieving local
and national food security, securing rural livelihoods,
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conservation of landscape amenity and cultural heritage,
and environmental quality and ecosystem service
provision.
The policy challenge is complex given these multiple
goals, the multifunctionality of land use, the form and
distribution of relevant property rights, and the small farm
sizes and diversiﬁed livelihoods of many farmers in China.
High productivity, high resource use efﬁciency and low
environmental risk cannot all be achieved everywhere.
When trade-offs must be made, what should take priority
and how should the interests of the farmer be balanced
against those of wider society? For example, should the
farmer, ﬁnal consumer, supply chain intermediaries or
government bear any costs of producing food in less
environmentally damaging ways? It may also take years to
reverse past degradation of soil and water[5]. Thus, policy
choices involve both the intra- and inter-generational
distribution of costs and beneﬁts and political choices are
necessary. Coherent choice of policies and the means for
their delivery are needed. This paper identiﬁes key
components for this and brieﬂy assesses current relevant
capacities in China.
2 Materials and methods
Preparation of this paper primarily employed review and
analysis of literature and secondary data. This was
supplemented by semi-structured interviews with key
informants and direct observation during visits to farms,
villages and on-farm trials in China. The author also
participated in workshops and conferences with national
level scientists and stakeholders.
3 Policy options for AGD in China
A priority is to remove, or at least reduce, perverse effects
of producer price support or input subsidies that encourage
inefﬁcient or damaging farming methods. Such economy-
wide policies neglect spatial variation in biophysical
conditions and can incentivize production poorly matched
to natural resource availability and ecosystem capacity to
absorb pollution in a given location[6].
Policies to inﬂuence farmer practice then include
regulation, economic incentives and promotion of volun-
tarism[7,8], but it is a combination of these that will be
required. For example, biophysical uncertainties and the
temporal, spatial and scale characteristics of farming in
China make a solely regulatory approach very costly, if not
impractical. Use of economic incentives alone may
similarly be difﬁcult and costly to administer. For example,
polluting emissions can be taxed but measurement and
enforcement costs for this are likely to be prohibitive.
Alternatively, the farm input causing emissions can be
taxed but demand for its use is likely to be inelastic, thus
limiting effectiveness. Making such a tax higher will tend
to be limited in China by concerns for food prices, trade
competitiveness, potential for substitution of polluting
practices (pollutant swapping), farm incomes and equity
for farmers already compliant with input use advice.
Lastly, change through voluntarism alone will also be
limited by small farmer income needs once trade-offs
between productivity and environmental protection apply.
Thus, combined and layered policies are likely to be
superior to any single policy, and this can be depicted in an
idealized form as in Fig. 1.
Cost-effective regulation and technology transfer to
farmers is needed to establish a baseline of ‘good’ farming
practice that achieves high productivity, high resource use
efﬁciency and low environmental risk. In Fig. 1 this is
termed the reference level[10] and deﬁnes standards to be
achieved by farmers at their own cost. This level can be
raised by technological innovation and effective BMPs that
sustain or increase productivity while reducing environ-
mental risk. Investment in agricultural research and the
knowledge base that supports the policy framework in
Fig. 1 is thus essential. Development of BMPs can extend
the range of geographical areas, farming systems and farm
scales for which trade-offs between productivity and
environmental protection can be minimized. This is
important given the diversity of crop and livestock
production systems in China and of regional agro-
ecological conditions. Research also provides policy
makers, farm advisers and farmers with information on
expected BMP outcomes, costs and adoption rates.
Above the reference level, trade-offs must be managed,
and for further environmental protection this requires more
regulation, voluntarism by farmers and usually payment to
farmers (at least as compensation for income foregone).
When such compensation is to be paid, the reference level
becomes a compliance condition that farmers should meet
to receive payment[7]. Given budget constraints, the
triangular shape of Fig. 1 represents how use of payments
to farmers will have to be spatially targeted. Political
choices must be made to target those locations for which
AGD requires achievement of greater environmental
protection at the expense of constrained productivity.
Payments to farmers in targeted areas can be termed
payments for ecosystem services (PES). In effect, an
environmental service (most often a land use providing the
service) is paid for by the state, or other buyers. Narrowly
deﬁned, PES requires payments for the opportunity cost to
the farmer of the service provided, conditional on its
delivery[11]. In practice causal relationships are difﬁcult
and costly to quantify, and payments are rarely conditional
on ecosystem service output. More commonly, payments
contribute to estimated income foregone, farm infrastruc-
ture improvements and/or costs of BMPs, based on
assumptions that this will deliver the buyer’s objective[12].
Other incentive policies to change farmer behavior can
involve other market-style mechanisms. For example,
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trading of irrigation water allocations, or of emission
quotas given a cap-and-trade regime for a water pollutant
such as nitrate[6]. Examples exist but achieving change at
scale requires that conditions vary sufﬁciently across farms
within an area to allow gains from trading net of
transactions costs. In addition, even proxy measurement
of water volumes, emissions or environmental change
remains costly and institutionally demanding[6]. However,
offsetting schemes offer potential, at least for environ-
mental improvements. For example, wetlands banking can
create wetlands (or other conservation areas) in multiple
locations and sell credits to expanding or intensifying
commercial farms to offset any wetland or other environ-
mental loss.
Figure 1 also suggests that advice provision and
voluntary action are crosscutting corequisites for regula-
tion and for incentive schemes. There are too many farm
management choices and varied local conditions to
monitor for regulation alone to be either affordable or
effective. Similarly, for monitoring of conditionalities
attached to incentives. Making regulation or incentives
work at farm scale, particularly for thousands of small
farms, is dependent on and enhanced by voluntary
compliance. Consequently, if protection of the environ-
ment is to go beyond prosecution of only the most
egregious and visible cases of harm, there must be local
and voluntary acceptance of the responsibilities which
regulation or an incentive scheme requires.
Farm advice can also encourage and assist a farmer in
complying with regulation or incentive scheme condition-
ality at the least cost. It can also promote adoption of those
BMPs that can achieve high productivity, high resource
use efﬁciency and low environmental risk. Farmers
themselves sometimes innovate or improve such technol-
ogies and farm advice services can aid dissemination of
resulting best practice.
Professional technical providers, able to work well with
farmers, developers and local government are a valuable
resource. Generic technical capacities needed include
understanding of relevant planning, environmental and
land use regulation, and of environmental conservation,
land management, farming systems, surface (including
highway and storm water drainage) and riparian corridor
management. To be most effective for AGD, farm advice
needs to holistically appraise alternatives for the farm
business and a farm family’s objectives, and not just focus
narrowly on either productivity or environmental protec-
tion. The best farm advisers come from the same region
and social background as farmers, speak with the same
accent or dialect and share the same concerns about the
local economy and environment[13].
Thus, a coherent choice of policies depends on the
Fig. 1 A policy framework for agricultural green development (AGD). Adapted from Smith et al.[9], with permission from Elsevier.
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complementarities between research, regulation, incen-
tives, voluntarism and advice provision. Given the inherent
variability of farming practice, farm sizes in China and the
costs of monitoring and enforcement, the reference level of
regulation can only be used to manage severe environ-
mental risks even at regional or farming system scale. Its
existence, however, sets the baseline for consistency and
additionality of voluntary and incentivized further
improvement. Helping, for example, to avoid giving
incentives to worst-case farmers. Advice provision then
facilitates and improves choices made by farmers.
Ultimately most of their compliance and adoption
decisions are voluntary and will be improved by access
to high quality information and advice.
4 Capacities to implement policies for AGD
in China
4.1 Economy-wide policies
There appears to be limited scope for reducing negative
environmental impacts of agricultural support policies in
China, although this may increase if current policy trends
continue to stimulate domestic production[14]. Relevant
policies introduced since 2004 include direct payments for
grain production, a general subsidy for agricultural inputs,
a subsidy for adoption of improved crop varieties, a farm
machinery purchase subsidy, minimum grain purchasing
prices, support for temporary storage, and subsidies for
agricultural insurance, credit, land consolidation, and soil
conservation and improvement[14,15]. Despite this diver-
sity, the value of support by farm remains relatively low
and can be considered decoupled from production
decisions[9,14]. However, larger farms offer more potential
for AGD through more cost-effective regulation and
advice, and capability to undertake environmental protec-
tion measures[3], and thus existing farm support at least
partly inhibits land transfer, farm restructuring and pooling
of farmland into farming cooperatives[16,17]. China is also
largely missing the policy tiers in Fig. 1 labeled as basic or
near-universal incentives and wide-spread incentives.
Where it is necessary to prioritize environmental protection
there is a need to move from the existing subsidies that aim
to ensure yields and farm incomes “to a green subsidy
which focuses on agro-ecological compensation”[18].
The fertilizer sector in China also merits further reform.
A policy of price caps was removed in 2009 but import
tariff reductions are still used to mitigate domestic
shortages, and the industry’s energy, transport, storage
and credit costs are subsidized[19]. The general farm input
subsidy and these industry subsidies contribute to
inefﬁcient manufacturing, variable quality, relatively low
domestic compared to world prices and excessive and
poorly managed use by farmers[9,16].
4.2 Regulation
For AGD, relevant farm-level regulation and its effective
enforcement have been inadequate in China. This has been
inevitable given the number and size of farms, their historic
role in economic development and the long-standing
growth-ﬁrst mentality of ofﬁcials and scientists[16]. More
recently, direct command and control policies including
standards and rules regulating agricultural pollution have
been introduced to reduce water pollution from livestock
and agrochemicals and air pollution from biomass
combustion. For example, in 2015 the Ministry of
Agriculture set caps to growth in agricultural chemical
use to be achieved by 2020[3]. Recycling of biomass in
situ, as livestock feed or through bio-energy generation, is
also encouraged and often subsidized.
Authorities in most countries are sparing in enforcement
of regulation of agriculture given the costs of legal
prosecution and often a lack of political support for a
rigorous approach[9]. China is no exception[20], but its
agricultural sector lacks the politicization and lobbying by
farming organizations that has been inﬂuential in limiting
farm regulation in, for example, Europe and North
America. Despite this, farm scales and low incomes may
still limit the compliance-related costs that can be imposed
before many small farms become non-viable[21,22].
Even when there is a strong intent at high level to
regulate for environmental protection in China, it has been
observed that this is often decoupled from ability for
implementation and enforcement at a regional or local
level[20,23,24]. The environment ministry provides guidance
to the environmental protection bureaus that exercise
environmental governance locally but lacks authority over
them, while local governments control their stafﬁng,
ﬁnancing and hence decision making, and may prioritize
economic growth over environmental protection[25].
Bureaucratic fragmentation and overlapping of
responsibilities can also result in a lack of coordination
and ineffective regulation[23,26]. The transaction costs of
coordination across sectors and agencies can also be
burdensome[3]. Other historic barriers to strengthening
farm regulation are the great diversity of China’s
physical geography and farming systems, and again
weak interagency communication, data sharing and
coordination.
The Ministry of Ecology and Environment was created
in 2018 to integrate environmental protection responsi-
bilities and unify supervision and enforcement responsi-
bilities, including assimilation of the responsibilities of the
Ministry of Agriculture for agricultural non-point source
pollution[26]. This creates a powerful and dedicated body
for environmental regulation and progress has been made.
Further improvement in baseline regulation of the farming
sector can be foreseen, but coordination between agencies
and levels of government will remain necessary[26].
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4.3 Incentive schemes
PES schemes in China are generally described as eco-
compensation programs. Most have concerned provision
of watershed ecosystem services in upper catchment
areas[27] and have made compensation payments in cash
and/or grain to farmers who reduce deforestation, soil
erosion and/or water consumption. Leading examples
include the Sloping Land Conversion Program[28], the
Grain for Green Project[29] and the Paddy Land-to-Dry
Land Program[30,31]. Such programs have shown some
success[31], but observers suggest that targeting, design,
environmental outcomes, sustainability, setting of farmer
compensation, institutional gaps, scheme overlaps,
effective tools for monitoring ecological outcomes and
overall program cost effectiveness could all have been
improved[29,31–37]. A lack of farmer and community
participation in scheme design and implementation and
effective engagement of local government and civil society
intermediaries has also contributed to weak out-
comes[27,38]. Further improvement would come from
strengthening policy design and implementation capacity
through improved inter-agency collaboration and
networking[39].
Growing demand for improved environmental quality,
water, leisure activity and tourism may increasingly
provide drivers and ﬁnance for further eco-compensation
schemes, although to date most schemes in China involve
transactions between local governments in upstream and
downstream watersheds rather than other private enti-
ties[40]. Key tenets of Fig. 1 including a reference level for
farming practice, spatial targeting and conditionality of
payments need to be understood by stakeholders and
inform scheme design. Schemes need to be well adapted to
Chinese conditions, locally varied[30] and innovative in
institutional arrangements to overcome resource con-
straints and resolve jurisdictional issues over cross-
boundary ecosystem service provision[34].
4.4 Voluntarism
A culture of environmental stewardship by farmers and
communities has many historical antecedents in traditional
farming practice in China but often lacks contemporary
practical expression. There is great potential to improve the
efﬁciency of farming practice while maintaining produc-
tivity and reducing risk to the environment. For example,
management of soils, manures, chemical fertilizer and
irrigation could all be improved to more closely match crop
requirements, reduce risk of losses to air and water and
save on-farm input costs (e.g., Powers et al.[5] and Chen
et al.[41]. However, scope for change through voluntary
action by farmers often remains limited by ﬁeld and farm
size, plot fragmentation, income levels, prevailing knowl-
edge, attitudes and practices (in part age and gender
related[17]), and increasingly by labor constraints[16,42].
The potential for more larger and more commercial
farms[3] brings greater scope for change, but an ethos to
maximize production may still drive the decision-making
in such farms[16].
4.5 Agricultural advice
All the above considerations emphasize the need for an
effective agricultural knowledge and innovation system
and the ability to change farmer behavior through advice,
training and access to technologies. Relatively well-
resourced, including stafﬁng and number of township
stations, and with a clear and hierarchical institutional
structure, the public agricultural extension service (PAES)
is the leading resource available in China to achieve AGD.
Indeed, it is the largest public agricultural extension system
in the world with approximately 700000 staff[43].
However, many observers are critical of its performance,
emphasizing: low responsiveness to community and
farmer needs; low trust in the service among farmers;
insufﬁcient information provision and use of information
technology in remote areas; functional specialization and
‘silo-working’ at ministerial, provincial, municipal and
county levels (though at township level a single station
usually implements all extension activities); and lack of
coordination and scientiﬁc consensus with universities and
research institutes[9,44,45].
Farmers are too often passive recipients of recommen-
dations with little formalized opportunity to feedback
priorities and needs. At local level the education level of
extension agents is relatively low, efﬁciency in input use
and environmental protection have been low priorities for
advice given in rural areas, and the PAES remains focused
on productivity increase and lacking in strategies to
balance this with environmental protection even when
appropriate BMPs are known and available[16]. In
comparison to other countries, for example the UK, it is
also notable that China lacks non-governmental organiza-
tions focused on environmental conservation that could
help mediate between state and farmers and to further tailor
advice and technologies to local conditions.
5 Conclusions
A focus on three policy approaches can be recommended.
First is the need for baseline regulation of good farming
practice. Laws are already in place at national level but
transposition of these into binding regulations at a
provincial and local level is needed. Robust and cost-
effective means for monitoring and enforcement then need
to be developed, and this could be enhanced by
engagement with and participation by the farming
community in any given location or region. As a minimum,
as land transfer continues at a pace appropriate to local
conditions, a reference level of enforceable regulation for
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all large commercial farms is needed.
Second, targeted incentive payment schemes (eco-
compensation subsidies) can be used strategically to
protect areas of high ecological quality and value,
managing the inevitable trade-offs between productivity
and environmental risk that exist in the most sensitive
environmental areas. Payments would facilitate conversion
of land out of intensive agricultural production to lower
intensity farming or other land use with lower risk of
pollutant emissions. Payment regimes are needed that
ensure long-term land use change and prevent reversion.
For this, payments need to be sustained over long enough
for farmers to be able to develop alternative income
streams or migrate. Objective and transparent approaches
are needed, and again these can be enhanced though
engagement with all stakeholders at a local level. The
literature evaluating eco-compensation schemes in China
is now extensive, and it is time to draw lessons of
experience from this to improve policy design and
implementation well-matched to local conditions.
Third, a relatively well-resourced PAES exists to help
farmers maintain and increase agricultural productivity and
this can be reoriented and reskilled for AGD. There is
potential to reform the priorities, ethos and modes of
working of the PAES. The service also has the potential to
coordinate and quality assure the actions of other actors
within an increasingly diverse national agricultural knowl-
edge and innovation system. Reorientation and retraining
for staff and managers at all levels will be required. The
need is to rebalance the importance of productivity
alongside the stewardship of farm inputs, natural resources
and wider environmental protection. Farm advice should
emphasize resource use efﬁciency, proﬁt maximization and
environmental protection alongside the goal of high
productivity. It should increasingly address farms as
businesses, looking beyond yields to the objectives of
the farm family or business, and to management of costs,
labor use, crop residues and animal wastes, marketing and
supply chains and environmental impacts. Advice and
training modes should become more differentiated by farm
size, management type and cropping system. Similarly, a
greater diversity of communication and education methods
should be employed, matched to the needs and access of
different farmer types, and additionally targeting wider
public awareness of environmental quality and food
safety[46].
Both farm advice provision and continuing agricultural
research needs to be tailored to farmer needs as informed
by their participation in a two-way dialog. Closer
interagency working, with improved communication and
data sharing at all levels, are also required to develop the
new ethos and overcome barriers to coordination created
by functional divisions and specializations. Support should
be given to emerging farmer associations and cooperatives,
while large agro-enterprises should be well-regulated but
also assisted and utilized as demonstrations of best
practice. Small farmers in China are experienced but
often aging and poorly educated[17]. However, a cadre of
skilled managers of larger enterprises is growing and
provides a resource for innovation, practice and demon-
stration in pursuit of environmental protection. Amalga-
mation of farms through land transfer also offers growing
efﬁciencies of scope and scale for provision of advice and
technology transfer (and for implementation of eco-
compensation schemes)[22]. To support and facilitate each
of the three approaches identiﬁed here, investment is
needed in applied research to build an accessible knowl-
edge base. This knowledge base must encompass methods
for public participation through to design and costing of
farm BMPs and design of institutional mechanisms for
eco-compensation.
Through cross-scale, cross-level and cross-sector colla-
boration and coordination between agencies and farming
communities, adaptive formulation and implementation of
complementary policies well-tailored to local conditions
can be achieved. This can be expected to consist of
regulation, incentives, advice provision and voluntarism.
Research and knowledge management are also funda-
mental in support. Information should ﬂow between levels,
organizations, stakeholders and the wider public to
facilitate shared understanding, improve interventions,
minimize conﬂicts, garner support and coordinate action.
Effective intermediaries that can facilitate collaboration
and coordinated action across locations, scales and
activities are key. Hence, it may be necessary to strengthen
human and organizational capacity and accountability at
local level, and programs for AGD need to be built from
existing organizations and partnerships, strengthening and
expanding these as necessary.
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